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From Loving to Romer: Homosexual Marriage and 
Moral Discernment 
Richard F. Duncan • 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I am delighted to take part in this symposium on Loving v. Virginia1 
and the politics of marriage. Loving, the landmark decision in which the 
Supreme Court invalidated state laws mandating racial apartheid in mar-
riage, is 30 years old this year.2 It clearly has withstood the test of time. 
I celebrate two things. First, I celebrate the eminent rightness of the 
Court's decision in Loving and its steadfast opposition to a racist definition 
of civil marriage. Second, I celebrate moral discernment, an attribute that 
continues to inform the common sense of the community, but which is in 
danger of becoming "the duty that dare not speak its name"3 in the legal 
academy and elsewhere among the "herd of independent minds."4 
Loving is a case in which public morality triumphed over social pa-
thology. The Court held that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment requires that 
the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discrim-
inations."5 Loving not only renounced the poisonous doctrine of White 
Supremacy, it also freed the institution of marriage from the debasement of 
anti-miscegenation laws. 
The legacy of Loving is threatened today by those who seek to use the 
courts to accomplish a radical and dangerous agenda - the reordering of 
marriage to reflect the alleged equal goodness of homosexuality and het-
erosexuality. As Richard Neuhaus has observed, those who have failed to 
persuade the public "that homosexuality is a good or even a morally neu-
• Copyright © 1998 by Richard F. Duncan. Shennan S. Welpton, Jr. Professor of Law, 
University of Nebraska College of Law. This Essay is based upon my presentation at a conference 
on Law and the Politics of Marriage: Loving v. Virginia After Thirty Years. I wish to thank Dave 
Coolidge, all the conference participants, and the co-sponsors of the conference, the law schools of 
Catholic University, Howard University, and Brigham Young University. This Essay is dedicated to 
my wife, Kelly, and to my children, Casey, Joshua, Rebecca Joy, Hannah Grace, and Kathleen Noel: 
I pray that you will not live in a world that calls evil good and good evil. 
1. 388 U.S. I (1967). 
2. The case was decided on June 12, 1967. !d. 
3. Richard John Neuhaus, Love No Matter What, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 1997, at 84. 
4. /d. 
5. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
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tral thing,"6 now seek to employ constitutional litigation as a tool "to re-
make the world in the image of their dissent."7 
The purpose of this Essay is to share some preliminary thoughts about 
Loving, gender, equal protection, and homosexual "marriage." It is not my 
task here to provide a full and complete analysis of the constitutionality of 
the heterosexual paradigm for marriage.8 Rather, I will first devote my ef-
forts to explaining why I believe the institution of marriage does not dis-
criminate on the basis of gender. Then I will briefly summarize the work I 
have published elsewhere9 analyzing the impact of Romer v. Evans 10 on 
the question of homosexual marriage. Finally, I will share some conclud-
ing thoughts on Loving, moral discernment, and same-sex marriage. 
II. RICKY, LUCY AND FRED: EQUAL PROTECTION, GENDER, AND 
HOMOSEXUAL MARRIAGE 
A number of academic advocates of homosexual marriage have argued 
that traditional marriage laws violate equal protection because they dis-
criminate on the basis of gender. ll Although this clever attack on tradi-
tional marriage laws is superficially plausible, it is contrived and ultimately 
unpersuasive. 
Professor Koppelman uses an I Love Lucy hypothetical to demonstrate 
his view that marriage laws discriminate on the basis of gender when they 
define marriage as a relationship between one man and one woman. 12 Un-
der traditional marriage laws, reasons Koppelman, Ricky may marry Lucy 
but he may not marry Fred. The reason Ricky is denied a license to marry 
Fred is because of gender- if Ricky were a woman, he would be allowed 
to marry Fred. Thus, "Ricky is being discriminated against because of his 
6. Neuhaus, supra note 3, at 84. 
7. /d. at 83. 
8. For a brilliant defense of the constitutionality of traditional marriage laws, see Lynn D. 
Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. I. 
9. See Richard F. Duncan, The Narrow and Shallow Bite of Romer and the Eminent 
Rationality of Dual-Gender Marriage: A (Partial) Response To Professor Koppelman, 6 Wm. & 
Mary Bill of Rights J. 147 (1997). 
10. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). 
11. See. e.g., Andrew Koppelman, W1zy Discrimination Against Lesbians And Gay Men Is Sex 
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social 
Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 187; Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 
70 IND. L.J. 1 (1994). A plurality of the Hawaii Supreme Court recently decided that the State's 
dual-gender marriage law discriminates on the basis of sex under the state constitution. Baehr v. 
Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). The case was remanded to the trial court, and on December 3, 
1996, the trial judge ruled that the Hawaii marriage law violated the state constitution. The case is 
currently awaiting review in the Hawaii Supreme Court. For an excellent description of the Hawaii 
litigation, see David Organ Coolidge, Same-Sex Marriage? Baehr v. Miike and the Meaning of 
Marriage, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 1, 7-18 (1997). 
12. Koppelman, supra note 11, at 208. 
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sex"13 and this triggers heightened scrutiny under equal protection doc-
trine.14 
It is certainly true that Ricky and Fred cannot marry anywhere in the 
world. There is a unanimous, international consensus15 on the meaning of 
marriage as a unique interpersonal "community defined by sexual comple-
mentarity."16 However, marriage laws do not treat men and women un-
equally. To the contrary, far from being based upon a desire to discrimi-
nate on the basis of gender, conventional marriage laws recognize the full 
and equal contribution of both men and women to the institution of mar-
riage, the most essential building block of civilized society. 17 
Marriage is a dual-gender relationship in the sense that a lawful mar-
riage requires participation by both a man and a woman. Marriage laws 
apply the same equal standard to each gender - neither men nor women 
may marry a person of the same gender. Neither the benefits nor the bur-
dens of these laws are distributed unequally to men or women as a class. 
Therefore, these laws do not discriminate on the basis of gender. 18 
The problem with the "equal application" counter-argument is that it 
was made - and rejected - in defense of Virginia's anti-miscegenation 
laws in Loving. The so-called "Loving Analogy" is a problem for those 
defending marriage laws, but not an insurmountable problem. Prohibiting 
interracial marriages is one thing; recognizing that marriage is an equal 
partnership between one man and one woman is something quite different. 
In Loving, the State of Virginia argued that its anti-miscegenation laws 
did not "constitute an invidious discrimination based upon race" because 
they punished "equally both the white and the Negro participants in an 
interracial marriage."19 The Court rejected the equal application defense 
because Virginia's anti-miscegenation laws were based upon a clearly in-
13. /d. 
14. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2274 (1996) (stating that parties who seek 
to defend laws that discriminate on the basis of gender must establish an "exceedingly persuasive 
justification" for the gender classification). This burden of justification "is demanding and it rests 
entirely on the State." !d. at 2275. 
15. At present, no country or state in the world recognizes homosexual relationships as 
marriages. Lynn D. Wardle, International Marriage and Divorce Regulation and Recognition: A 
Survey, 29 FAM. L.Q. 497, 500 (1995). Although Sweden, Denmark, and Norway have legalized 
"domestic partnerships" for homosexual couples, lawmakers in these nations carefully distinguish 
domestic partnerships from marriage. /d. 
16. Coolidge, supra note II, at 29. 
17. See Wardle, supra note 8, at 87. See generally id., at 38-39, 75-88. 
18. See id. at 84: 
The heterosexual marriage requirement does not facially discriminate on the basis of gender, 
or reinforce stereotyped gender roles discriminantly, because it does not distinguish between 
what men and women are permitted to do nor between the governmental benefits they may 
obtain. Formally, men and women are treated the same by the heterosexual marriage 
requirement because both genders are equally required to marry only persons of the other 
gender. 
19. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 8 (1967). 
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vidious purpose - an endorsement of the doctrine of "White Suprem-
acy."20 Indeed, in Nairn v. Naim, 21 an unreconstructed Virginia Supreme 
Court of Appeals unabashedly defended the State's anti-miscegenation 
scheme as properly designed "to preserve the racial integrity of its citi-
zens," to "regulate the marriage relation so that [the State] shall not have a 
mongrel breed of citizens," and to prevent "the corruption of blood."22 
Of course, as Chief Justice Warren pointed out in Loving, the statute 
was not neutral in its concern about racial integrity - it was based upon 
the invidious idea that the white race was superior and must be protected 
against the "corruption of blood" that would result from marriages be-
tween whites and non-whites.23 In his seminal Article on the Court's land-
mark segregation decisions,24 Professor Charles Black eloquently captured 
the injustice of laws mandating racial segregation: 
Then does segregation offend against equality? Equality, like 
all general concepts, has marginal areas where philosophic 
difficulties are encountered. But if a whole race of people finds 
itself confined within a system which is set up and continued 
for the very purpose of keeping it in an inferior station, and if 
the question is then solemnly propounded whether such a race 
is being treated "equally," I think we ought to exercise one of 
the sovereign prerogatives of philosophers-that of laughter. 25 
Like laws mandating racially segregated schools for children, a system of 
racial apartheid in marriage is "inherently unequal."26 Chief Justice Warren 
applied this legal, political, and moral truth in Loving just as he had more 
than a decade earlier in Brown v. Board of Education. 27 
Loving, then, is a case about racial segregation and equal protection. 
What does the reasoning of Loving tell us about the argument that the 
dual-gender marriage requirement constitutes unlawful discrimination on 
the basis of gender? The answer is not very much. 
20. /d. The Court twice cited (and capitalized) this poisonous doctrine that strikes at the core 
of the concept of racial equality under the law. /d. at 7, II. 
21. 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955). 
22. /d. at 756. 
23. Loving, 388 U.S. at 7. The law prohibited only interracial marriages between whites and 
non-whites. Thus, the law's expressed concern with racial integrity extended "only to the integrity 
of the white race." /d. at 11 n.ll. 
24. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 
(1960). 
25. /d. at 424. 
26. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
27. !d. 
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The heterosexual paradigm reflected in the dual-gender requirement is 
not based upon the notion that one gender is superior and one inferior. 28 
Therefore, the anti-miscegenation law struck down in Loving is not analo-
gous to laws defining marriage as a dual-gender union of husband and 
wife. As Professor Wardle put it, "[t]he heterosexual marriage 
requirement ... merely recognizes the unique social importance of the in-
stitution of marriage for relationships, complementarity, and generativity 
that lie at the heart of the social interest in marriage."29 Anti-miscegenation 
laws separated the races; but conventional marriage laws integrate the gen-
ders. Anti-miscegenation laws endorsed the invidious doctrine of White 
Supremacy; but conventional marriage laws provide for the full and equal 
participation of one man and one woman in the institution of marriage. 
Anti-miscegenation laws-like laws requiring racial segregation in schools 
and other public facilities-were properly held to violate the central mean-
ing of the Equal Protection Clause. However, by requiring participation by 
one person of each gender, conventional marriage laws affirm the concept 
of gender equality and convey a critically important message about the 
equal indispensability of both men and women to the institution of mar-
riage.30 
The Loving Analogy is simply inapposite. Dual-gender marriage laws 
do not classify on the basis of gender. They merely define marriage as a 
relationship between one man and one woman and apply the same neutral 
rules to both men and women. The Loving court rejected equal applicabil-
ity as a justification for anti-miscegenation laws for reasons that clearly do 
not apply to the dual-gender definition of marriage. 31 Properly understood, 
the same-sex marriage issue is about an eminently reasonable distinction 
drawn on the basis of sexual orientation; it is not about an attempt to stig-
matize one gender as inferior and untouchable.32 
Some commentators counter with the radical feminist argument that 
the "compulsory heterosexuality" of conventional marriage laws is de-
signed to keep "women in relationships in which men exert power over 
their lives.'m According to one commentator, the "homosexuality taboo" is 
similar to the "miscegenation taboo" and endorses the message that "[s]ex 
equality is dangerous; it will reduce men to the level of women."34 Profes-
28. See Wardle, supra note 8, at 87-88. 
29. /d. at 85-86. 
30. !d. at 87. 
31. "The Loving Court did not repudiate equal applicability as a justification for classification 
by gender, but only as a justification for invidious racial discrimination." !d. at 84. 
32. See Wardle, supra note 8, at 86; Sunstein, supra note II, at 19. 
33. Koppelman, supra note II, at 249. 
34. /d. Professor Eskridge also cites "feminist psychology" to support this theory. Under his 
"hypothesis," "[f]eminized men and masculinized women" are treated as "objects of intense hatred 
by men hoping to reaffirm a manhood about which they are deeply uncertain." WILLIAM N. 
244 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 12 
sor Sunstein "speculates"35 that the ban on same-sex relationships is the 
product of "impermissible sex-role stereotyping."36 He argues that the het-
erosexual paradigm is based upon the "definition of men as essentially ac-
tive in social and sexual arenas, and of women as essentially passive in 
both places."37 Sunstein cites no less an authority than Iron Mike Tyson in 
support of this remarkable assertion: 
Thus, it is a familiar part of violent male encounters that the 
victim will be feminized, as in boxer Mike Tyson's remark to 
challenger Donovan "Razor" Ruddock: "I'm going to make you 
my girlfriend." I suggest that far from being an oddity, this 
comment says something deeply revealing about the relation-
ship between same-sex relations and the system of caste based 
on gender.38 
Sunstein's reliance on this kind of evidence in support of his "specula-
tions" about the meaning of the institution of marriage says something 
deeply revealing about the weakness of his argument. 39 Dual-gender mar-
riage laws do not impose any sex-role stereotypes on married couples. Men 
and women are free to define their roles as husband and wife any way they 
please. The law recognizes the critical importance of both men and women 
to the institution of marriage and leaves to each couple the task of deciding 
how to conduct their life together. This is perfectly consistent with equal 
regard for men and women under the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, 
it is perfectly consistent with both the holding and the reasoning of the 
Court in Loving. 
Interestingly, one of the leading advocates of same-sex marriage, Pro-
fessor William Eskridge, bases his argument for radical change at least in 
part on an egregious sex-role stereotype. Eskridge argues that one of the 
major benefits of state recognition of same-sex marriage is the "civilizing 
effects" it is likely to produce for gay men.40 Eskridge says "[g]ay men are 
EsKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 169 (1996). Straining to pass a gnat, Eskridge 
asserts this "evidence" supports the argument that conventional marriage laws discriminate "by reason 
of a sex-based classification." /d. at 170. 
35. Sunstein, supra note II, at 22. 
36. /d. at 23. 
37. !d. at 22. 
38. /d. 
39. Sunstein, "[a]gain speaking speculatively," asserts that the "ban on lesbian relations" is 
designed (at least in part) "to ensure that women are sexually available to men." !d. Actually, 
according to the best estimates of the homosexual population, homosexual males significantly 
outnumber lesbians. See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 128 (1992) (3 to 4 percent of adult 
males and only 1 percent of adult females "have a strongly homosexual preference"). Thus, if straight 
males really wanted to maximize their opportunities to compete for sexually available women, they 
would strongly support homosexual relations. 
40. ESKRIDGE, supra note 34, at 82-84. 
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like Ulysses, who directed that he be bound to the ship's mast as it passed 
the Sirens, sea creatures whose seductive voices enticed men to their 
deaths.'>41 "Likewise," continues Eskridge, homosexual males "tend to lose 
their balance and succumb to private sirens if they are not socially and 
even legally constrained."42 Eskridge seems to think that same-sex mar-
riage will tie gay males "to the ship's mast" and help them to live more 
disciplined, perhaps even monogamous, lives. Indeed, he thinks that same-
sex marriage is a good thing because it "civilizes gay men by making them 
more like lesbians."43 Eskridge's use of a sex-role stereotype does not nec-
essarily undermine his argument in favor of same-sex marriage, but it does 
call to mind the classic aphorism about glass houses and the throwing of 
stones. 
At the end of the day, the argument that the traditional definition of 
marriage violates the principle of gender equality misses the mark. Tradi-
tional marriage laws treat men and women with equal regard and endorse 
an extremely important social message about the equal indispensability of 
each gender to the institution of marriage. Moreover, these laws do not 
impose or endorse any sex-role stereotypes on married couples; husbands 
and wives are free to define their roles within marriage any way they 
please. The institution of marriage, as it exists today everywhere in Amer-
ica, is perfectly consistent with our Nation's enduring commitment to gen-
der equality. The attempt to use Loving to radically transform the nature of 
marriage is misguided and should be rejected. 
III. ROMER, MARRIAGE, AND RATIONALITY 
In Romer v. Evans, 44 the Supreme Court considered an equal protec-
tion challenge to Colorado Amendment 2, a citizen initiative that amended 
the Colorado state constitution to forbid all levels of state and local gov-
ernment from adopting any statute, ordinance or policy designed to protect 
41. !d. at 83. 
42. !d. 
43. !d. at 84. Eskridge is correct in recognizing that sexual promiscuity is a serious problem 
for many homosexual males. See THOMAS E. SCHMIDT, STRAIGHT & NARROW: COMPASSION & 
CLARITY IN THE HOMOSEXUALITY DEBATE 106-07 (1995). However, as Richard Posner has observed, 
homosexual marriage is not the solution for this problem. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 
305 (1992). Men are civilized by their wives and children, not by being tied to the ship's mast. !d. 
at 305-306. Indeed, one prominent advocate of same-sex marriage suggests that homosexual 
marriages might serve as models for a new kind of family life, one in which monogamy and sexual 
fidelity are not seen as "essential component[s] of love and marriage." Richard D. Mohr, The Case 
For Gay Marriage, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 215, 233 (1995). See also ANDREW 
SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY 202 (1995)(noting that in 
gay male unions "there is more likely to be greater understanding of the need for extramarital 
outlets"). It is certainly reasonable to resist this dangerous social experiment upon the institution of 
marriage. 
44. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). 
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homosexuals or bisexuals against any kind of discrimination.45 Romer is a 
unique equal protection case in which the Court invalidated what it called 
an "unprecedented'><~6 law that denied a particular group protection "against 
exclusion from an almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors 
that constitute ordinary civic life in a free society."47 It was the almost infi-
nite legal disability created by Amendment 2-not the identity of the class 
of persons disadvantaged by the Amendment-that concerned Justice 
Kennedy and his colleagues in the Romer majority.48 
Indeed, Romer is far more notable for what it did not do than for what 
it did do. The Court did not hold that homosexuals are a suspect or a 
quasi-suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause. It did not hold that 
moral disapproval of homosexual conduct is invidious or irrational. It did 
not hold that laws that make distinctions on the basis of sexual orientation 
or relationships are tainted by animus or dislike for a politically unpopular 
group.49 Nor did the Court find any new fundamental rights lurking in the 
shadows of our written Constitution. Amendment 2 failed the rational ba-
sis test only because no legitimate state interest came close to fitting the 
Amendment's nearly infinite path of disadvantage. 
Romer is not a "gay rights" case; it is a case about a limitless legal dis-
ability. The Court drew an inference of animus from the unlimited breadth 
of the disability created by Amendment 2 and from the fact that no legiti-
mate state interest reasonably fit the infinitely broad sweep of the law's 
coverage, not from the identity of the group subjected to the disability.50 
The Colorado Amendment would have failed the rational basis test with-
45. If allowed to go into effect, Amendment 2 would have been CoLO. CoNST. art. II, § 30b 
(overturned by Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996)). It stated: 
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation. Neither the 
State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its agencies, 
political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any 
statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, 
conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any 
person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected 
status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects 
self-executing. 
Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623. 
46. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628. The Court's literal reading of the text of Amendment 2 
enabled it to interpret the Amendment as being of almost unlimited breadth. 
47. !d. at 1627. 
48. /d. at 1627-28. 
49. See Duncan, supra note 9, at 155. The Court drew an inference of animus from the 
unlimited breadth of the disability created by Amendment 2, not from the identity of the group 
covered by the disability. /d. According to the Court, the extreme breadth of Amendment 2 outran 
and belied "any legitimate justifications that may be claimed for it." Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628-29. 
50. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629. The Court noted tbat under tbe rational basis test "a law must 
bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose . . . and Amendment 2 does not." 
/d. 
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out regard to whether it covered homosexuals, smokers, insurance sales-
men, or any other particular group. 
Under Romer and the rational basis test, laws that make distinctions on 
the basis of sexual orientation are presumptively constitutional. Such laws 
will be upheld so long as they are "narrow enough in scope and grounded 
in a sufficient factual context for [the Court] to ascertain that there exist[s] 
some relation between the classification and the purpose it serve[s]."51 If 
Romer governs the constitutionality of laws defining marriage as a rela-
tionship between one man and one woman, these laws will certainly be 
upheld because they are sufficiently narrow and focused to enable the 
Court to ascertain their eminent reasonableness.52 I have developed this 
argument in greater detail elsewhere, 53 and I have nothing further to add at 
present. 
This essay will now focus on the impact of Romer on the proposed 
amendment to the Hawaii state constitution that is designed to remove the 
issue of same-sex marriage from the state courts and return it to the politi-
cal process. The proposed amendment, which will be submitted to the peo-
ple of Hawaii in November 1998, reads as follows: "The legislature shall 
have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples."54 
Does this proposed amendment violate the Equal Protection Clause 
under Romer? Some might argue that non-recognition of same-sex mar-
riages singles out homosexual couples and denies them access to an exten-
sive list of tax, welfare, and other benefits made available to married cou-
ples by the state. But this argument misses the mark entirely. This is an 
easy case under Romer; the proposed Hawaii amendment should easily 
pass muster under the reasoning of Justice Kennedy's majority opinion. 55 
Unlike Colorado Amendment 2, the Hawaii Amendment focuses on a 
narrow and specific issue-the power of the legislature to define marriage 
as a dual-gender relationship-and does not impose an across-the-board 
disability on a particular group. 56 Romer explicitly states that laws such as 
this one will be upheld so long as they are narrow in scope and "grounded 
in a sufficient factual context" to enable the Court to ascertain the exis-
tence of some reasonable relationship between the law and any legitimate 
51. ld. at 1627. 
52. See Duncan, supra note 9, at 156. 
53. See id. at 156-165. 
54. Coolidge, supra note II, at 17. As part of the compromise that led to passage of the 
proposed amendment in the Hawaii Legislature, the legislature enacted a "reciprocal benefits" law 
providing certain benefits to "reciprocal beneficiaries" a term defined as "those legally ineligible to 
marry." /d. This is not a same-sex domestic partnership law. Reciprocal beneficiaries need not be 
of the same sex, nor does the law require a common household or an intimate relationship. For 
example, a widow and her son could qualify as reciprocal beneficiaries. /d. 
55. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. 
56. See Coolidge, supra note II, at 17. 
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governmental purpose. 57 The proposed amendment does not target a class 
of persons and deny that class the opportunity to protect itself politically 
against a limitless number of discriminatory harms and exclusions. The 
amendment merely permits the Hawaii legislature to define marriage as a 
dual-gender relationship; it does not forbid any individual or group from 
seeking political protection against any kind of public or private discrimi-
nation. 58 Same-sex couples are free to seek to amend any tax, welfare, or 
other laws privileging marriage to acquire the same or similar benefits. 
Indeed, gays and others ineligible to marry remain free to use the political 
process to change the marriage laws. 
The proposed Hawaii amendment is reasonably and substantially re-
lated to the clearly legitimate purpose of returning an important and con-
troversial political issue to the political branch of state government. If 
adopted by a vote of the people of Hawaii, the amendment will not decide 
the issue of same-sex marriage; rather, it will merely restore the power to 
decide that important issue of social policy to the Hawaii Legislature. The 
amendment is clearly related to the eminently legitimate goal of protecting 
the collective right of democratic self-government. 
Moreover, Crawford v. Los Angeles Board of Education,59 is control-
ling. In that case, the citizens of California amended the state constitution 
to provide that state courts shall not order mandatory pupil assignment or 
busing unless the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion requires such an order.60 In effect, the citizens of California amended 
the state constitution to restore the issue of busing to the political process 
(except when busing was mandated by the U. S. Constitution). The Su-
preme Court upheld the citizen initiative and expressly rejected "the con-
tention that once a State chooses to do 'more' than the Fourteenth Amend-
ment requires, it may never recede."61 The Court explained that to hold 
otherwise would be "destructive of a State's democratic processes and of 
its ability to experiment."62 This ruling decisively applies to the proposed 
Hawaii amendment and makes clear that when the state courts go "beyond 
the requirements of the Federal Constitution, the State [is] free to 
return . . . to the standard prevailing generally throughout the United 
States."63 Thus, under Romer and Crawford, the people of Hawaii are free 
to amend their state constitution to remove the same-sex marriage issue 
from the state courts. 
57. Romer. 116 S. Ct. at 1627. 
58. See Coolidge, supra note II, at 17. 
59. 458 U. S. 527 (1982). 
60. /d. at 529. 
61. Id. at 535. 
62. /d. 
63. Id. at 542. 
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IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON LOVING, MORAL DISCERNMENT AND 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
In THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, Professor Eskridge dismisses 
supporters of traditional marriage as either ignorant64 or emotionally unsta-
ble.65 Moreover, he dismisses Western civilization - at least since the 
thirteenth century - as "intolerant."66 He then provides what he calls a 
"mini-history of same-sex unions" to demonstrate that "same-sex mar-
riages ... have served civilizing functions"67 in the course of human his-
tory for both homosexuals and mainstream society. His point seems to be 
that sick societies like ours (i.e. those that do not celebrate same-sex "mar-
riages") have a great deal to learn from those societies that have recog-
nized and accepted homosexual unions.68 
I find this chapter of Eskridge's tome amazing. Consider two of his 
historical examples of how same-sex marriages have served "civilizing 
functions" in society. 
Eskridge cites the same-sex "marriage" of the Roman Emperor Nero 
as one example of a "publicly celebrated same-sex marriage."69 Since Nero 
ruled Rome absolutely, his sexual activities were, I suppose, sanctioned by 
Rome. But is Nero a suitable role model for Eskridge to claim in support 
of his campaign to celebrate the goodness of homosexual marriage? Don't 
we need to know a little more about Nero and his same-sex "marriage"? 
Few would disagree that Nero was one of the most evil men in history. 
He was responsible for the murder of his mother Agrippina, and he waged 
a vicious religious holocaust against Christians.70 The circumstances of at 
least one of Nero's same-sex "marriages" are no less depraved. When 
64. ESKRIDGE, supra note 34 at 183. 
65. ld. at 183-85. He asserts that "most people" who disagree with him are suffering from 
what he calls a "fear of flaunting." ld. at 183. In other words, most Americans are tolerant about 
private, consensual homosexual conduct, but are unwilling to support laws that celebrate and 
subsidize homosexual unions as legally •ecognized "marriages." Eskridge labels this large group of 
his fellow citizens "unhealthy." He puts it this way: "It is beyond my competence to psychoanalyze 
Americans' complex emotional reaction to open homosexual expression, but medical professionals 
generally consider anti-homosexual feelings mentally unhealthy." /d. at 185. This remarkable assertion 
by Eskridge is risible. It needs no further response. 
66. /d. at 16. 
67. ld. 
68. ld. 
69. ld. at 23. 
70. WILL DURANT, CAESAR AND CHRIST 277-281 (1944). According to Tacitus, Nero's 
pogrom against the Christians was exceedingly cruel: 
They were put to death with exquisite cruelty, and to their sufferings Nero added mockery 
and derision. Some were covered with skins of wild beasts, and left to be devoured by 
dogs; others were nailed to crosses; numbers of them were burned alive; many, covered 
with inflammable matter, were set on fire to serve as torches during the night. 
ld. at 281 (quoting TACITUS, ANNALS XV 44 (1830)). 
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Nero's wife, Poppaea, died in the year 65, Nero grieved bitterly her pass-
ing.71 He found a boy, Sporus, "who closely resembled Poppaea, ... had 
him castrated, married him by a formal ceremony, and 'used him in every 
way like a woman.' "72 Eskridge does not explain how Nero's "celebrated" 
same-sex union produced civilizing effects on Roman society.73 The reader 
is left to figure this out for herself. 
Another historical example cited by Eskridge-he calls it the "most 
interesting example of same-sex initiation relationship"74-involves a form 
of "ritualized homosexuality"75 practiced by certain aboriginal populations 
of Australia and Melanesia. This interesting "man-boy" rituaC6 involves 
boys being prepared to enter manhood and heterosexual marriage by first 
being sodomized by adult males. As Eskridge explains it, "by inseminating 
a boy the older male is believed not only to facilitate the boy's passage into 
manhood but also to prepare him for his marriage to a woman.'m 
Eskridge lacks moral discernment, the ability to distinguish between 
right and wrong. In his world, "most people" (i.e. those who support tradi-
tional notions of sexual morality) are either evil or mentally ill.78 However, 
he seems to think we have much to learn from the Emperor Nero's sexual 
perversions and from the "man-boy" homosexual rituals he finds so "inter-
esting. "79 
At the end of the day, the "case for same-sex marriage" fails because it 
lacks the quality that animated the Supreme Court's opinion in Loving- a 
71. Poppaea was killed "in advanced pregnancy, allegedly from a kick in the stomach; rumor 
said this had been Nero's answer to her reproaches for having come home late from the races." /d. 
at 281-82. See also JOHN BISHOP, NERO: THE MAN AND THE LEGEND 148 (1964). 
72. DURANT, supra note 70, at 282. Suetonius confirms the circumstances of Nero's abuse 
of this unfortunate boy. "Having tried to tum the boy Sporus into a girl by castration, he went 
through a wedding ceremony with him-dowry, bridal veil and all-took him to his Palace with a 
great crowd in attendance, and treated him as a wife." GAlUS SUETONIUS TRANQUILLUS, THE TwELVE 
CAESARS 195 (Robert Graves trans., Allen Lane 1979). It is clear that Eskridge has Sporus in mind 
when he refers to Nero's "publicly celebrated" same-sex marriages. See William N. Eskridge Jr., A 
History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419, 1446-47 (1993). 
73. Nero's second same-sex "marriage"-to Doryphoros-was almost as (if not more) 
depraved as his "marriage" to Sporus. Suetonius describes it as follows: 
Nero practiced every kind of obscenity, and after defiling almost every part of his body 
finally invented a novel game: he was released from a cage dressed in the skins of wild 
animals, and attacked the private parts of men and women who stood bound to stakes. 
After working up sufficient excitement by this means, he was dispatched-shall we 
say?-by his freedman Doryphorus. Doryphorus now married him-just as he himself had 
married Sporus-and on the wedding night he imitated the screams and moans of a girl 
being deflowered. 
SUETONIUS, supra note 72, at 195. 




78. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text. 
79. See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text. 
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well-developed sense of moral discernment. The Court in Loving under-
stood that the institution of marriage is "fundamental to our very existence 
and survival."80 It was precisely because Mildred and Richard Loving had 
formed "a unique community defined by sexual complementarity"81 that it 
was wrong for Virginia to prohibit their marriage. Because race is irrele-
vant to what makes a relationship a marriage, it was immoral and unconsti-
tutional for Virginia to forbid interracial marriages. However, unlike Vir-
ginia's racist restriction on marriage, the dual-gender requirement is based 
upon the inherent sexual complementarity of husband and wife.82 As Jus-
tice Ginsburg observed in United States v. Virginia: 83 "Physical differ-
ences between men and women ... are enduring: '[T]he two sexes are not 
fungible; a community made up exclusively of one [sex] is different from a 
community composed of both.' "84 
V. CONCLUSION 
The dual-gender marriage requirement does not treat men and women 
unequally. Instead, it recognizes and celebrates the physical differences 
between men and women and their obvious sexual complementarity. Tra-
ditional marriage laws do not discriminate on the basis of gender; rather, 
they recognize the equal indispensability of both genders to the institution 
of marriage. The dual-gender requirement, like the decision in Loving, is 
animated by a moral sense that discerns the true nature of marriage. As 
Justice Ginsburg put it so well, most people understand that the two sexes 
are not fungible and that dual-gender marriages and same-sex unions are 
very different things indeed. These fundamental differences provide a rea-
sonable (indeed, I would say a compelling) justification for traditional 
marriage laws. The legacy of Loving is dishonored by those who seek to 
use the decision as a tool to radically remake the institution of marriage "in 
the image of their dissent."85 
80. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 12 (1967). 
81. Coolidge, supra note 11, at 29. By the time the Lovings came before the Supreme Court, 
their marriage had been blessed with three children. See ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF 
EARL WARREN 449 (1997). 
82. "In this view, marriage is a unique community defined by sexual complementarity-the 
reality that men and women are 'different from, yet designed for' one another." Coolidge, supra note 
II, at 29. The Loving Court demonstrated its awareness of this biological reality when it referred 
to marriage as "fundamental to our very existence and survival." Loving, 388 U. S. at 12. 
83. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996). 
84. /d. at 2276 (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U. S. 187, 193 (1946)). 
85. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
